# IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE 2 3 4 EVELYN GIARDINA and FRED WEEKES, 5 No. A052096 Petitioners and Appellants, 6 Alameda County 7 v. Superior Court MARIE MCKECHNIE, City Clerk of No. 673368-7 8 the City of Berkeley, Honorable Howard L. Respondent Schwartz, Presiding 10 LONI HANCOCK, Mayor of the City of Berkeley, 11 Real Party in Interest 12 and Respondent. 13 14 15 16 AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 17 IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT MARIE MCKECHNIE 18 19 20 LOUISE H. RENNE 21

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1			TABLE OF CONTENTS	Page	
2	•			_	
	TABLE	OF F	AUTHORITIES	ii	
3	INTRO	1			
4	ARGUM	2			
5	THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED RELIEF				
6		BECAUSE APPELLANTS SOUGHT AN ORDER			
7		LEG.	ISLATURE HAS SPECIFICALLY FORBIDDEN	2	
8		Α.	Section 1013 Forbids The Remedy Giardina Requests That This Court Order	3	
9		В.	Strict Compliance With \$1013's Deadline		
10		٠.	Is Necessary To Preserve The Integrity Of The Elections Process	5	
11			N IF THE LAW DID NOT PROHIBIT THE REMEDY		
12	II.	CIA	RDINA REQUESTS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HION SUCH A REMEDY IN THIS CASE	8	
13 14 15	III.	TUG	AUSE MCKECHNIE DID NOT NEGLECT ANY Y SHE HAD TO GIARDINA OR THE VOTERS, DATE MAY NOT ISSUE TO COMPEL HER TO NT LATE BALLOTS	9	
16		Α.	The Duty To Promptly Mail Absentee Ballots To Applicants	12	
17 18		В.	The Duty to Provide Voters With Information Necessary For Voting	14	
19	CONCI	LUSIC	)N	16	
20					
21					
22			·		
23					
24			<u>-</u>		
25					
26					

### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2	<u>Cases</u>	Dage
3		<u>Page</u>
4	Escalante v. City of Hermosa Beach (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1009	4, 7
5	<u>Fair v. Hernandez</u> (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 868	5
6	Fair v. Hernandez	·
7	(1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 578	4
8	<u>In re East Bay etc. Water Bonds of 1925</u> (1925) 196 Cal. 725	9
10	Menlo Park School Dist. v. Tormey (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 76	9, 16
11	Veteran's Finance Committee of 1943 v. Betts (1961) 55 Cal.2d 397	6, 15
12 13	Wilks v. Mouton (1986) 42 Cal.3d 400	11
14	Women Organized for Employment v. Stein (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 133	
15	(1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 133	11
16	<u>Statutes</u>	
17	California Code of Civil Procedures	
18		
19	Section 1085	11
20	California Elections	
21	Section 305 Section 500	7 7
22	Section 503 Section 1008(b)	7 14
23	Section 1013	PASSEM
24	Section 14005(d)	14
25	_	

26

#### INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no single enterprise administered by a municipal government is so fraught with the potential for error as an election. From the registering of voters and assigning of precincts, to the printing of ballots, to the ballots' distribution, marking and counting, tens of thousands of opportunities for mistakes arise, even in an election held in a small community. To ensure that California elections are carried out in as fair, consistent and impartial a manner as possible, California's Elections Code imposes a myriad of duties on those charged with administering elections. Nonetheless, it is simply inconceivable that this process could be error free.

In December 1990, the City of Berkeley held a runoff election. Berkeley's City Clerk, Marie McKechnie, oversaw the administration of the election. Appellants Evelyn Giardina and Fred Weekes (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Giardina") can point to no statutory duty McKechnie failed to fulfill. They only point to a few ways in which the election could have been more perfectly administered.

On this showing, Giardina asked the trial court to order McKechnie to perform an act specifically forbidden by California law. California's Elections Code codifies a fundamental principle of democratic elections law by forbidding the counting of ballots received after the close of the polls. But that is exactly what Giardina asked the court below to order McKechnie to do. The Superior Court correctly declined Giardina's invitation.

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At most, the facts of this case demonstrate a possible need for further clarity and fine tuning from the legislature regarding election procedures. But it is the legislature, not the judiciary, that has the institutional competence to evaluate the need for clarity and to provide it if necessary.

This Court's role is limited to examining the record and determining whether there is any substantial evidence to support the Superior Court's conclusion that Berkeley's runoff election was conducted in accordance with the Elections Code's requirements. Because substantial evidence shows that those requirements were met, the trial court was correct in denying the extraordinary remedy Giardina requested.

## ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED RELIEF BECAUSE I. APPELLANTS SOUGHT AN ORDER COMPELLING THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT THE LEGISLATURE HAS SPECIFICALLY FORBIDDEN.

In her 48-page brief, Giardina scrupulously avoids reminding this Court of the relief she sought. The reason is The relief -- an order requiring McKechnie to count late ballots -- is specifically forbidden by the Elections Code. Section 1013 states that absentee ballots received after the close of the polls on election day "cannot be counted." This law upholds the integrity of the elections process by providing a firm, absolute and objective time limit on voting. The Superior Court properly refrained from ordering McKechnie to violate the legislature's mandate.

The outcome of this case is of great importance to the amici because Giardina would have this Court fashion an exception to §1013's mandatory language. The exception would strike at the heart of the legislature's intent in drafting and amending §1013. Also, the exception would strip §1013 of its valuable message that candidates and voters can count on elections being over when the polls close. Finally, the exception would deprive election officials and courts of the bright line afforded by §1013's deadline.

# A. Section 1013 Forbids The Remedy Giardina Requests That This Court Order.

The legislature could not have been more clear in mandating that absentee ballots not be counted if received after the close of the polls on election day. Before 1986, §1013 provided, in relevant part, as follows:

After marking the ballot, the absent voter may return it to the official from whom it came by mail or in person, or may return it to any member of a precinct board at any polling place within the jurisdiction. The ballot must, however, be received by either the official or precinct board before the close of the polls on election day.

Thus, §1013 stated that all absentee ballots must "be received . . . before the close of the polls on election day."

If that were not clear enough, in 1986 the legislature amended the first sentence of §1013, changing the word "may" to "shall," and then, in 1987, added the following sentence to the end of the statute: "The provisions of this section are mandatory, not

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directory, and no ballot shall be counted if it not delivered in compliance with this section." $^{\frac{1}{2}}$ 

The legislature's 1987 amendment of §1013 was meant to "clarify the potential ambiguity contained in" the Supreme Court's decision in Wilks v. Mouton (1986) 42 Cal.3d 400. (Stats.1987, c. 22; see West's Ann.Cal.Elec.Code (1991 Cumulative Pocket Part), §1013, "Historical and Statutory Notes".) The legislature reaffirmed that its intent "is and always has been that the provisions of Section 1013 are mandatory and not directory in effect," and cited Fair v. Hernandez (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 578, as a correct statement of the legislature's intent. (Id.) Finally, the legislature stated that its intent "is and always has been that any ballot cast in violation of Section 1013 cannot be counted, particularly when such a ballot would affect the result of the election." (Id.; see Escalante v. City of Hermosa Beach (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1019-20.)

There is no room for disagreement on this point. The legislature has directed that any ballot received after the polls close "cannot be counted."

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{1}{}$  Remarkably, Giardina fails to mention this important language in §1013 when she quotes what she describes as the "pertinent" passages of §1013. (Appellants' Brief at 7, n. 5.)

<sup>2/</sup> Giardina devoted a section of her brief to an argument entitled "The Statutes Creating the Deadline in Question Did Not Preclude the Remedy Sought by Petitioners." However, she failed to mention in her discussion that the legislature amended §1013 four years ago to compel the opposite conclusion. Giardina also fails to cite Wilks or the 1982 Fair decision.

B. Strict Compliance With §1013's Deadline Is Necessary To Preserve The Integrity Of The Elections Process.

In the case the legislature cited with approval, Fair v.

Hernandez, supra, the court addressed the question of whether 11

absentee ballots delivered to the city clerk by a candidate's campaign worker violated §1013 and therefore could not be counted. The court held that §1013 mandated that the votes not be counted because the absentee ballots were delivered by someone other than the voter.

The <u>Fair</u> court recognized that "'[P]reservation of the integrity of the election process is far more important in the long run than the resolution of any one particular election.'" (138 Cal.App.3d 578, quoting its earlier opinion, <u>Fair v.</u>

Hernandez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) The same principle applies here. Even if the record supported a finding that a failure to count the contested absentee ballots would cause some unfairness to some potential voters, that unfairness is greatly outweighed by the necessity to preserve the integrity of the election process and count only those ballots received by the statutory deadline.

Firm and consistent application of the law is perhaps nowhere as important as in the area of election law. Unless all candidates and voters are treated the same, a perception of manipulation of the democratic process is inevitable. Voters will lose confidence in the electoral process if a court or an election official excuses one candidate or one group of voters

from compliance with a well established deadline or other requirement. It is certain that if McKechnie <u>had</u> taken it upon herself to count the late ballots in this case, the supporters of whichever candidate came up short would have cried "foul!"

In addition to ensuring evenhanded treatment, a firm election deadline enables citizens to know with certainty an election's outcome shortly after the election. Only a "no exceptions" deadline, as mandated by §1013, can accomplish this purpose. For example, in this case if McKechnie were ordered to count all ballots postmarked by election day, when would the results be final? How long should McKechnie assume it takes for "properly postmarked" ballots to arrive? Should McKechnie wait one day, three days, one week or two weeks from the election to announce the results? As the Superior Court stated below:

Sections 1013 and 1016, regarding receipt of the absentee ballot by the close of the polls, indicate a clear legislative intent to conclude and determine elections in a timely manner and avoid prolonging the determination of the results due to the uncertainty of mail delivery. It most likely was also its intention to limit legal challenges to elections. . . .

Giardina claims that the late voters were "disenfranchised" by McKechnie's decision to honor §1013's deadline. But voters are presumed to know statutory deadlines. (Veteran's Finance Committee of 1943 v. Betts (1961) 55 Cal.2d 397, 402.) A voter who fails to vote before the time state law sets for the last ballot to be cast may have caused himself or herself to be

"disenfranchised," but that voter was not "disenfranchised" by the person who enforced the law's deadline. 3/

Individuals who fail to deliver their ballots before the close of the polls are no more disenfranchised than individuals who are not permitted to vote because they did not comply with other procedures required of all voters, for example, (1) failing to register no later than "28 days immediately preceding an election" (§305), or (2) failing to include on an affidavit of registration "all the facts required to be stated" (§\$500 and 503; see Escalante v. City of Hermosa Beach (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1023.)

In short, in faithfully executing the election laws, an elections officer is obligated to enforce the rules evenhandedly on all who fail to satisfy the procedural steps necessary to vote in our democratic system. The assertion that those failing to follow mandated voting procedures have been "disenfranchised" ignores the fact that the franchise is extended only to those who opt to vote at the times and in the manner specified by law.

The "disenfranchised" voters in this case did not comply with the voting deadline the legislature has mandated. Their votes therefore should not--the legislature has said "cannot"--be

<sup>3/</sup> In fact, if the late ballots in this case were counted, that decision would arguably "disenfranchise" individuals who did not vote because they knew they would be unable to reach the polls on time on election day and because they knew that the law provided that their absentee ballots would not be counted if simply mailed on election day.

counted. Counting late ballots would not only conflict with state law; it would undermine the fairness and impartiality of the elections system.

II. EVEN IF THE LAW DID NOT PROHIBIT THE REMEDY GIARDINA REQUESTS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FASHION SUCH A REMEDY IN THIS CASE.

Even if §1013 did not specifically forbid the counting of late ballots, the remedy Giardina requests is impossible to provide. As discussed in more detail below, Giardina claims that McKechnie violated her alleged duty promptly to mail absentee ballots to applicants. Giardina argues that this conduct "disenfranchised" certain potential voters, and she wants their franchise returned by counting ballots postmarked by election day.

However, the order Giardina desires would not accomplish her stated purpose. On the record below, there was simply no way for the trial court to find which of the ballots postmarked, but not received, on election day came from individuals who received their absentee ballots so close to election day that they did not have a reasonable amount of time to exercise their right to vote. Many of the contested ballots may have come from people who applied for and received their ballots weeks before the election, but procrastinated in depositing their completed ballots in the mail. In addition, counting the contested ballots would not return the franchise to all the individuals who received their absentee ballots "late," because some did not receive the ballots until after election day, and others